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The architecture of European treaty law is rather like that of an American gold- 
digger town last century: after setting up the three Communities in the founding 
treaties, new constructions were added on various occasions according to current 
needs, without adapting them exactly to what existed; structures no longer 
needed were, as it were, simply left standing as legal ruins in the landscape. 
Among such poorly coordinated additions were European Political Cooperation, 
laid down in the 1986 Single European Act, and still more the “roof, temple or 
pillar construction” of the European Union, created by the Maastricht Treaty. 
Among things not explicitly regulated, there was in particular whether the 
Communities are to be absorbed in the Union to such an extent that their actions 
are to be attributed to it alone, so that it is correspondingly to be assigned legal 
personality of its own.1 2 These uncertainties are also reflected in the names of the 
bodies: while Art. C (1) ascribes a “unitary institutional framework” to the Un­
ion, only the Council appears as “Council of the European Union” - even in 
Community questions - while the Commission and Court of Justice continue to 
have the tag “ of the European Communities”, even where they operate in areas 
in the Union’s province (the CFSP and CJHA)3. Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty 
(AV), too, brought still further complication of primary law by communitarizing 
further areas of the third pillar while retaining intergovernmental features.4
Yet the uncoordinated additions are outnumbered in primary law by the 
legal ruins mentioned earlier. According to a survey done by Roland Bieber in
1 A former German version of this text was published in v. Bogdandy/Ehlermann, "Kon- 
solidierung und Koharenz des Primarrechts nach Amsterdam", Europarecht, Beiheft 2/1998, 
p. 17. It was first presented at a workshop to evaluate the Amsterdam Treaty held in Frankfurt 
a. M. in May 1998 .1 wish to thank Ian Fraser for his help with the translation.
2 Though the authors of the Maastricht Treaty presumably wished to set up the Union without 
legal personality, and this finding also represents the prevalent view in the literature in Mem­
ber States, the Council simply ignored this, for instance when it officially let the Union take 
over the administration of the city of Mostar (Council Decision 94/308/CFSP of 16 May 
1994; OJ EC 1994 L 134/1, Art. 1: “Administration of the city o f Mostar by the European 
Union”; see also Council Decision 94/790/CFSP of 12 December 1994, OJ EC 1994 L 326, p. 
2” ).
3 See v. Bogdandy, in EUI Florence, Robert-Schuman-Centre, A Unified and Simplified 
Model o f the European Communities Treaties and the Treaty on European Union in Just One 
Treaty, foreword, pp. 6f
4 For this see also Miiller-Graf, "Justiz und Inneres nach Amsterdam - Die Neuerungen in er- 
ster und dritter Saule", Integration 1997, 271 (282); Rupprecht, "Justiz und Inneres nach dem 
Amsterdamer Vertrag", Integration 1997, 264 (269); den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs 
Cooperation in the Treaty on the European Union: More complexity despite communautari- 
zation”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (MJ) 4 (1997), 311, See also 
the article by Haring in v. Bogdandy/Ehlermann, "Konsolidierung und Koharenz des Primar­



























































































1995 these now consist, after 20 Treaty amendments and revisions, of over 15 
individual texts with well over 1,000 individual provisions, of which almost 400, 
especially transitional and time-limited measures, have become obsolete. For in­
stance, the prominently placed Articles 13-27 in the EC treaty, on the Customs 
Union, already became obsolete with the introduction of the Common Tariff in 
June 1968 and the expiry of the transitional period in late 1969. With its 
opaquely tangled structure and many obsolete provisions, the acquis com­
munautaire has, as Franklin Dehousse recently5 tellingly put it, turned into the 
maquis communautaire. In this undergrowth of Community law, the important 
constitutional principles of clarity and openness of legal bases understandably 
tend to dwindle into mere empty formulas.
More importantly, beyond this ’external’ disorder, the actually existing 
European primary law has come to diverge more and more from the text of the 
treaties as a result of the ECJ’s famous innovative jurisprudence: The judicial 
doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, pre-emption, interprétation conforme, 
state liability and human rights, to name but the most important ones, have 
gradually detached the EC treaties from traditional international treaties and 
rendered them more similar to a national (federal type) constitution - what is 
called the ’constitutionalisation of the treaties’.6 Though of utmost importance 
for the development of the European polity as a whole, this incremental judicial 
process has remained widely hidden to the citizens. Therefore, the call was in­
creasingly made that not only had the treaties to be simplified and consolidated, 
but also brought into a more constitution-like shape, in order to contribute to a 
larger degree of acceptance of Europe by its citizens.
Among these various forms of legal intransparence and disorder, this 
contribution addresses mainly the development of and the responses to what has 
been called the ’external’ disorder of EC primary law.7 In particular, the history 
of the simplification and consolidation efforts will be presented (II), three major 
academic drafts of alternative treaties analysed (III) and the rather modest out­
come of the Amsterdam measures of simplification commented upon (IV). In 
examining the possibilities of farther-reaching consolidation, this contribution 
advocates a US type ’Restatement’, i.e. a non-binding compilation of the whole
5 F. Dehousse, "Le Traité d’Amsterdam, reflet de la nouvelle Europe", CDE 1997, 272, A 
similar assessment is given by J. V. Louis, "Le traité d’Amsterdam - Une occasion perdue?", 
RMUE, 2/1997, 5 (18), according to whom the AT is a missed opportunity for inter alia a far- 
reaching improvement in the transparency of the text.
6On this notion, see Weiler’s classic, "The Transformation of Europe”, Yale L.J., 100 (1991), 
2403.
7This notion is here taken to mean all provisions that have come about by international treaty 





























































































body of EC primary law (V). Such a legal text is meant to incorporate all valid 
law regardless of its legislative or judicial origin, in particular the ECJ’s famous 
constitutionalisation doctrines; even a catalogue of human rights as recognised 
by the ECJ in its jurisprudence could possibly be included. To this limited ex­
tent, this contribution goes beyond mere formal simplification and consolidation 
strategies and broaches the thorny issue of the constitutionalisation of the Euro­
pean treaties.
II. A Brief History of Simplification and Consolidation
Despite the obvious disorder in EC primary law described above, the Communi­
ties and the Union took a great deal of time over cleaning up their legal bases. 
While the need to consolidate primary law had first been put as long ago as 1965 
in the preamble to the Merger Treaty, which named legal unification of the three 
Communities as an objective, after the merger of their authorities, the task of 
consolidation was taken up in practice only after the setting up of the Union8. 
After the Council, Commission and Court had once again in their reports on the 
application of the Union treaty in 1995 come out in favour of a comprehensive 
consolidation of the primary law including its codification, i.e. bringing together 
the most important texts in a single treaty document, the Corfu European Coun­
cil set up a reflexion group which started by asking the Council general secre­
tariat for a report of possible alternatives in simplification and consolidation. 
This mentioned, as conceivable, alternative or cumulative measures: 1) deleting 
obsolete provisions and adapting the remaining ones; 2) bringing the main trea­
ties together into a single legal document; and 3) partly restructuring the treaties 
by exporting minor provisions of a technical nature to protocols. To support the 
requisite work, the European Parliament now gave a first mandate to produce a 
consolidation draft to the Centre de Droit Comparé et Européen at the University 
of Lausanne, headed by Roland Bieber. For its part, the Reflexion Group pre­
sented a report in December 1995 unrestrictedly recommending the simplifica­
tion project, while pointing to the reservations by some States regarding farther- 
reaching codification of primary law9. On the basis of these findings the Council 
Presidency-in-Office drew up a mandate, in the conclusions to the Turin Euro­
pean Summit for the 1996 IGC, to try out a simplification and consolidation of 
primary law - whereby the term consolidation was presumably meant as an um­
brella concept for all clean-up measures, reaching from mere simplification
8 On the history, see Petite, "Le traité d'Amsterdam: ambition et réalisme", RMUE, 3/1997, 
17; Jacqué, "La simplification et la consolidation des traités", RTDE, 1997, 905ff; and for a 
tabular summary of the outcome, Dodd/Ware/Weston, "The European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill: Implementing the Amsterdam Treaty", Research Paper n° 97/112, House 
of Commons Library, 8ff.




























































































(deleting obsolete provisions and adapting the remaining ones accordingly) over 
further consolidation measures (e.g. restructuring certain parts of the treaties, 
e.g. putting together similar provision on institutions into one part; exporting 
less important provisions into protocols) up to complete codification (putting to­
gether and restructuring all primary law texts in a single document)10 1.
After the Turin summit, the Council general secretariat first itself pro­
duced several consolidation proposals for illustrative purposes. In parallel, the 
European Parliament gave the Robert Schuman Centre at the European Univer­
sity Institute in Florence a further mandate to draw up a new consolidation draft. 
This task was carried out there by a research group with international member­
ship" headed by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann; the Rapporteur was Armin v. Bog- 
dandy. Following this preliminary work, the Dublin European Council clarified 
the final mandate for the 1996 ITC as being to work out a largely simplified ver­
sion of the treaties - consolidation no longer came into it. This version was to be 
more easily readable for the European citizen and have a more comprehensible 
shape, while not affecting the (legal) acquis communautaire or the present 
structure of primary law, particularly the division into three pillars. This made it 
definitively clear that the reform was to be confined to technical measures “à 
droit constant”. This also meant rejecting merger of the legal personalities. In 
parallel with the IGC the work was thenceforth carried on by a separate group of 
experts, called “les amis de la présidence” (essentially consisting of members of 
the permanent representations) independently from the preparations for the sub­
stantive treaty amendments. The proposals worked out by this group for simpli­
fying the treaties were essentially taken over in the AT12. It was not however 
possible at the IGC to put through any further consolidation13. To be sure, decla­
ration n° 42 on the Final Act of the AT says further consolidated versions are to 
be published by the Council general secretariat, though without legal validity. 
Finally, in October 1997 a working group of the Centre for European Legal 
Studies at Cambridge University, headed by Alan Dashwood and Angela Ward, 
presented a third draft consolidation for the EC treaty, already incorporating the 
outcome of the AT. Since they contain nearly all discussed simplification and 
consolidation strategies, the academic consolidation drafts published, namely the 
Lausanne, Florence and Cambridge drafts, deserve closer attention.
10 The terminology is somewhat unclear in Jacque (Fn. 5), 905ff, who, on the one hand, 
speaks of a failed “consolidation” (p. 905), but, on the other, later on calls further clean-up 
efforts, particularly as regards merging the various treaties, “codification” (pp. 910ff).
11 The group members were Renaud Dehousse, Eduardo Garcia de Enterria, Jean-Victor 
Louis, Yves Meny, Francis Snyder and Giuseppe Tesauro; with, in an advisory capacity, Lord 
Jack MacKenzie-Stuart, Max Kohnstamm and Emile Noel, who died shortly before the work 
was completed; the draft is dedicated to his memory.
12 See III, point 1-3 below.




























































































III. The Academic Consolidation Drafts
According to Parliament’s instructions, the drafts were in particular, in order to 
bring greater clarity while retaining the existing state of the law, to:
improve the linguistic quality and - by rearranging the provisions - also 
the logical structure of the treaties;
clean-up the treaties editorially, in particular deleting obsolete provisions; 
distinguish between institutional provisions and the various policies, and 
finally
bring together the three Communities and the Union’s areas of activity 
into a single treaty, setting general principles, constitutional provisions 
and European fundamental rights at the beginning14.
These instructions, which clearly go considerably beyond the European Coun­
cil’s Decisions mentioned, were carried out very differently in the Lausanne and 
Florence mandated work and in the Cambridge project. They will now be dis­
cussed in the chronological sequence of their appearance.
1. The Lausanne Draft
As already indicated, the Lausanne draft contains a first part15 of value to all 
further work, inventorizing the whole of the primary law. In detail, alongside the 
Community treaties and the Union treaty, including their amendments, the Con­
vention on Certain Common Institutions of the European Communities of 
25.3.1957, the Merger Treaty of 8.4.1985, the Act introducing universal direct 
elections of members of the European Parliament of 20.9.1976, a number of 
other important acts of constitutional level and the 40 or so protocols to the 
Community treaties were considered in detail for their continuing legal rele­
vance. 920 Articles were found relevant to presenting the legal basis for the 
Community, and were selected for the consolidation. 239 of them could be im­
mediately deleted because they occurred two or more times and another 150 be­
cause they had in the meantime become obsolete.
The second part of the study16 brings the remaining 531 provisions together 
into a draft consolidation. It brings in a new subdivision leaving only important 
provisions with constitutional content in the consolidated treaty, while technical 
provisions of a more administrative nature as well as procedural provisions of 
the ECSC and Euratom treaties incapable of generalization are moved out to
14 OJ n° C151/51, n° 2, P. 14; the official mandate n° IV/92/29 that constituted the basis for 
the Florence draft was similar.
15 The European Parliament, Political Series W-16.




























































































newly created protocols. Thus, the new treaty text consists of only 311 provi­
sions, with the remainder in three protocols, on the internal market, on the Euro­
pean Coal and Steel Community and on the European Atomic Energy Commu­
nity. The advantage of this procedure is to further cut the volume of the treaties, 
making them more like a constitution as traditionally understood. Drawbacks 
unavoidably associated with this approach are that at least externally a hierarchy 
not laid down in the treaties is created, and individual treaty provisions tom 
apart, hindering a systematic overview17. The detailed structure of the Lausanne 
draft is as follows:
1) principles: here the individual provisions of the main treaties are coordinated 
and put together;
2) human and civil rights: here the fundamental freedoms, the provisions on 
Union citizenship and other subjective rights are arranged; but this section 
contains no actual catalogue of fundamental rights on the model of Member 
States’ constitutions or the ECJ case law;
3) relations with Member States: here all the provisions of the main treaties that 
govern the interplay of Community and Member States are brought in in a 
new order;
4) relations to third countries and international organizations: this section was 
given preference in order to emphasize the Union’s positive attitude to inter­
national law; it contains in a new numbering all the main treaties’ provisions 
on this area;
5) institutions and procedures: this section contains a general part with institu­
tional, procedural and budget dispositions based on the corresponding provi­
sions of the Community and Union treaties; ECSC and Euratom treaty provi­
sions not largely coinciding with the EC treaty and therefore hard to consoli­
date, were, as mentioned, put into corresponding protocols;
6) substantive legal principles: this part contains all the Community policies and 
the Union’s areas of operation;
7) general and final provisions: this part brings the corresponding provisions of 
the Community and Union treaties together; additionally, two new Articles 
were introduced repealing all the original treaties and making reference to the 
attached concordance tables.
17 The Lausanne proposal was, moreover, even extended by an anonymous author with the 
pseudonym Justus Lipsius ("The 1996 IGC", European L. Rev. 20 (1995), 235 (2650 - a high 
Brussels official - into a true dominance of protocols: the whole substantive law (eg in the EC 
treaty, Arts. 9-163a) would be put in protocols. Yet it would be at least rather odd if, say, Art. 





























































































A notable point about the content of the Lausanne Draft is that it combines the 
Communities and the second and third pillars of the Union into a single legal 
person, termed “Union”. While this change might seem very desirable, in part 
for reasons of transparency and simplicity, the draft is here departing, on an im­
portant and quite controversial point, from the existing legal position. This links 
up the debate on technical aspects of consolidation with the proposals for 
amending the content, which would likely diminish the chances of success of the 
former. On the whole, admittedly, the Lausanne Draft has, with its convincing 
restructuring of the individual sections, in particular with the formulation of 
easily graspable general parts, and the far-reaching consolidation of the individ­
ual treaty provisions, set criteria especially in technical legal respects that all 
later drafts have to be measured by.
2. The Florence Draft
The Florence Draft18 similarly pursues the objective of an integrative overall 
treaty absorbing all the existing main treaties. By comparison with the Lausanne 
Draft, however, it is based on a more reticent, minimalist approach. This appears 
particularly in the endeavour to refrain as far as possible from changing the law 
as it stands. Thus, the various legal personalities of the Communities are un­
touched, and nothing is said on the Union’s legal capacity. Additionally, the ex­
port of provisions to protocols is avoided.
In methodical respects this minimalist approach is also the basis for the pro­
cedure in consolidating individual provisions. This was done only where several 
provisions are either identical, or identical meaning is attributed to them in 
practice, or finally, existing differences have no practical relevance19. By con­
trast, consolidation of provisions with merely the same regulatory objectives but 
detailed differences of content was refrained from, even though this would have 
led to greater harmony and transparency20.
In detail, the Florence Draft consists in its main variant of 512 articles con­
solidating the provisions of the main treaties and other important texts of pri­
mary law (Single European Act, agreement on common bodies, treaty setting up 
a Single Council and Single Commission, Act introducing universal direct elec­
tions of members of the European Parliament). Alongside this, the Draft also of­
fers an alternative variant, in which, alongside the main text of the Community
18 EP, Legal Affairs Series W-9; on this see the analyses by v. Bogdandy/Ehlermann, CMLR 
33 (1996), 1107; EuZW 1996, 737, and the reviews by Koenig/Pechstein, NJW 1997, 996; 
Harings, NVwZ 1997, 979; Kugelmann, AVR 35 (1997), 323; della Cananea, Rivista trimes­
trale di diritto pubblico 1997, 617.
19 See foreword, p. 9.




























































































plus Union treaty, the ECSC and Euratom treaties continue to exist as separate 
treaties, though with the procedural provisions capable of consolidation, con­
tained in the main text, deleted. In detail, the Florence Draft has the following 
basic structure:
1) principles: here the introductory provisions of the two main treaties are re­
coordinated and brought together;
2) union citizenship: here the provisions of Art. 8-8e TEC are brought in;
3) institutional provisions: this part is the core of the Draft. Like the Lausanne 
Draft, it contains a “general part” for the institutions applying to their actions 
under all three pillars of the Union. This section also deals with the European 
Council mentioned only in the Union treaty, which is thus also regarded as an 
institution of the Communities;
4) activities and instruments
a) The European Communities
b) The Common Foreign and Security Policy
c) Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs
Here come the various policies of the Communities and Union, along with, 
in “special parts”, those provisions on institutions and procedures that are so 
different as not to be capable of consolidation;
5) general and final provisions: this part similarly brings the corresponding pro­
visions of the Community and Union treaties together.
With its consistently minimalist approach, the Florence Draft has to be regarded 
as a more realistic possibility for consolidating all the treaties in a single text. 
From the legal technical point of view, it probably makes a best job of optimiz­
ing the two conflicting objectives of on the one hand giving primary law a 
largely unitary structure while on the other leaving the specific features of 
Community and Union as far as possible untouched and thus maintaining the 
law as it stands.
It is worth noting, though, that Jean-Paul Jacque, Director in the Council 
General Secretariat, recently criticized the integrative approach in the Florence 
draft21 for dropping certain features of standing law, against the Dublin Man­
date: in particular, the general provisions were made common, and the European 
Council was elected into an institution. Additionally, merging all the treaties is 
seen as giving a poorly readable overall text, because it is relatively long. Yet 
this criticism cannot convince. On the one hand, the price for the alternative in 
the General Secretariat’s consolidation draft22, namely retaining the separation 
of Union and Community treaties, is relatively high: a unitary, transparent over­
all concept of primary law which would be easier to convey to the citizen is
21 Jacque (Fn. 5), 910.




























































































hardly realizable in this way. On the other, the formulation of general over­
reaching principles and pinning the European Council down as an institution of 
the Communities, too, ought not to have any practical consequences. Finally, the 
accusation of being too long only concerns the first variant. In variant 2 - the one 
without the substantive provisions of the ECSC and Euratom treaties - the Flor­
ence Draft contains more or less the same number of articles as the Lausanne 
one, or the General Secretariat’s own.
3. The Cambridge Draft
The Lausanne and Florence Drafts were recently joined by a further consolida­
tion draft from Cambridge University’s Centre for European Legal Studies 
which has the merit of taking the substantive amendments of the AT into ac­
count23. This Draft unfortunately confines itself to the EC treaty24, but makes the 
interesting attempt, on the model of the US Restatement25, alongside a restruc­
turing of the individual treaty provisions, also to formulate the ECJ’s funda­
mental case law abstractly in the language of statute. The individual provisions 
are accompanied by a commentary explaining the individual passages and giv­
ing the core decisions and legal literature (unfortunately nearly exclusively Eng­
lish language contributions) used in footnotes. Substantively, even controversial 
questions are frequently decided here: hypothetical lines of development of the 
case law that seem likely to the authors are included. A lot of space in this com­
pilation is also taken up by the Union’s constitutional bases, along with the doc­
trines developed by the ECJ on the interaction between Community law and na­
tional law. As an example, the Restatement’s provisions on direct effect and on 
primacy systematically and convincingly follow Article 5 EEC, and are as fol­
lows in the version of Article 1.1.6 (2) and (3) of the Cambridge Draft:
23 Published in European L. Rev. 22 (1997), 393.
24 The reason given, that it is too early for an overall consolidation as long as the coverage of 
each of the three pillars is provisional (Foreword, European L. Rev. 22 (1997), 398), is not at 
all convincing. For not only is the whole of Community law, as we know, constantly chang­
ing; additionally, the methods employed in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties for in­
cluding new matters - first incorporation in the Union’s operational areas, later, if appropriate, 
communitarization - might be becoming lastingly established as a constitutional principle that 
by definition has a dynamic nature. That being the case it seems completely unrealistic to wait 
for a definitive extent of the three pillars.
25 While the preface to the Draft explicitly mentions “Restatement” (European L. Rev. 22 





























































































(Article 5, as amended)
(2) The provisions of this Treaty and of acts of the Community’s institutions 
(hereinafter referred to as "Community provisions") shall, if and in so far as they 
are capable of being applied without having their content further defined by im­
plementing measures, produce direct effect within the legal orders of the Mem­
ber States. In particular, any rights arising under Community provisions shall be 
enforceable in the courts and tribunals of the Member States, by way of ade­
quate remedies available against any party on whom a corresponding duty is im­
posed.
(3) In the event of confclit between provisions applicable under the lega orders 
of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as "national provisions") and di­
rectly effective Community provisions, the latter shall prevail. To that end, a 
court or tribunal of a Member State shall refrain, if necessary of its own motion, 
from applying national provisions in all cases in so far as these conflict with any 
Community provisions applicable to matters of which the court or tribunal is 
seized.
Commentary: This Article incoporates the principles which, in their different 
ways, give substance to the declaration by the Court of Justice that "the Com­
munity Treaties established a new legal order for the benefit of which the States 
have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of 
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals."26
Paragraph (1) reproduces the present Article 5 which expresses the general duty 
of legal cooperation incumbent on the Member States.
Paragraph (2) is a formulation of the principle of direct effect. The condition that 
the Community provision in question be capable of judicial application repre­
sents a distillation of the case law, backed by the authority of former Judge Pes- 
catore.27 the second sentence of the paragraph acknowledges that directly effec­
tive rights are enforceable only against those on whom the provision relied upon 
imposes a corresponding duty (the vertical/horizontal distinction). It also makes 
the point that there is a duty on the Member State concerned to ensure the ade­
quacy of the available national remedies.28
Paragraph (3) expresses the principle of the primacy of Community law. The 
words "in all cases" indicate, without making the point too brutally, that the
“ Opinion 1/91, EEA Agreement [1991] E.C.R. 6079 at para. 21.
27Pescatore, "The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law", Euro­
pean L. Rev. 8 (1983) 155 at pp. 176 et seq.




























































































principle applies, irrespective fo the rank of the conflicting national provision in 
its own hierarchy, and of whether it was enacted before or after the community 
provision.29 The second sentence encapsulates the Simmenthal principle, that the 
duty of ensuring Community primacy falls on the national court seized of the 
substantive issue in the case.
Even if this version of the doctrine of direct effect and primacy still seems in 
need of improvement in various details29, it nonetheless clearly shows some of 
the advantages of a Restatement: the gain in transparency and the easier com­
prehensibility of the Community’s legal bases. Unfortunately, however, the 
Cambridge Draft departs from the classic Restatement idea by regarding later 
adoption as a legally valid treaty text as thoroughly desirable 30. This is, how­
ever, likely instead to prove counterproductive: for alongside probably insuper­
able political difficulties over adopting such a detailed and therefore necessarily 
also controversial text, there would also be reservations that the Community 
legislature was laying fetters contrary to its function on the ECJ case law31. The 
idea of a Restatement should accordingly be pursued in accordance with the 
classic US conception, without legal bindingness, in improved form and includ­
ing all the important texts of the primary law32.
29Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellscliaft, [1970] E.C.R. 1125; Case 106/77, Ammin- 
strazione delle Finanze v. Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. 629.
29 The preconditions for direct effect are not fully described; the leading cases, van Gend &_ 
Loos, ECJ [1963] 1, and Costa/Enel [1964] 1250, are missing; reference to the demarcation 
between lack of horizontal direct effect and admissible interpretation in conformity with di­
rectives might be an idea; also appropriate, finally, would be a reference to the fact that the 
primacy of Community law over core areas o f national constitutional law is not recognized in 
most Member States (the complete subordination of the MSS under the EU presupposing, in 
legal theory, a non-existent federal structure of the latter), and that instance courts in various 
Member States have no right to overthrow constitutional provisions. See on the problem of 
constitutional conflicts C. Schmid, From pont d ’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio, WP Law 1998/7, 
EU1 Florence.
30 See foreword, European L. Rev. 22 (1997), 395, under the heading “Aims”
31 The legislative fixation of the ECJ to particular interpretations, questionable from view­
points of a division of functions within the Community, should meet with a similarly negative 
response as the notorious “Barber-Protocol” to the Maastricht Treaty. Among many on this, 
see Everling, "Zur Stellung der Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Union als “Herren der Ver- 
trage”", in Festschrift f. Bernhard, 1995, 1161 (1 171f).




























































































1. Review of the Structure of the Amsterdam Treaty
In its first part (Art 1-4), the AT contains actual changes to the law of Commu­
nity and Union. These include simplifications of substantive law. Mention 
should be made in particular, in the context of institutional provisions, of the far- 
reaching elimination of the cooperation procedure under Art. 189 c EEC (re­
tained only in the area of monetary union) and the tightening of the codecision 
procedure under 189 b EEC by abolishing the third reading in the European 
Parliament. The legal technical simplifications of primary interest here are in­
stead regulated by the AT in Arts 6-8. Each of these three Articles is devoted to 
simplification in one of the three Community treaties; the Union Treaty has not 
been affected in this respect. Art. 9 AT lays down a further important simplifi­
cation: the repeal of the Convention of 25.3.1957 on common institutions and 
the Merger Treaty of 8.4.1965, with the exception of the protocol on privileges 
and immunities. The essential content of these texts was however incorporated 
in Art. 9 AT. Art. 10 AT contains a general provision on the basic concept un­
derlying simplification, maintenance of the legal acquis. Art. 11 explicitly ex­
tends ECJ jurisdiction to part 2 of the AT. Part 3 of the Treaty, consisting of 
general and final provisions (Art 12-15), contains in Art. 12 an important regu­
lation renumbering the Community and Union treaties and adjusting references. 
Art. 14 (2), finally, regulates the coming into force of the Treaty on the first day 
of the second month following deposit of the last ratification document” .
2. Extent of the Simplification
The simplifications ordered in Part 2 of the AT concern, as indicated, exclu­
sively the three Community treaties and the annexes and protocols attached to 
them; however, the declarations attached to these treaties remain largely unaf­
fected (because of their lack of legal bindingness) as do the various accession 
treaties (this essentially affects only transitional, time-limited and other detailed 
technical arrangements not already taken over into the main treaties). Only these 
changes, and not the amended versions of the treaties so created as a whole, 
have to be ratified by the Member States. However, Art. 12(1) AT bindingly re­
numbers the provisions of the Union and Community treaties, including the 
amendments and additions of the first two parts of the AT, according to concor­
dance tables contained in the annex to the treaty: cross-references and references 
in other Community treaties and other legal instruments and acts are to be ad­
justed (Art 12 (2-4) AT). This avoids big gaps because of deleted provisions, 
and makes the added letters for provisions incorporated in the Community treaty 3
33 The date aimed at for entry into force is 1.1.1999. See Agence Europe Nr. 7073 v. 6/7. 10. 
1997, 3.




























































































later superfluous. The new versions of the Union and Community Treaty pro­
duced by the change in numbering - which are not supposed to be ratified as 
such, and, accordingly, will not have binding effect - are attached to the Final 
Act of the AT for illustrative purposes. The many existing treaty amendments 
made this re-numbering overdue. The associated difficulties in orientation have 
accordingly to be put up with as unavoidable34.
The renumbering retained the existing structure of the treaties as far as possi­
ble. All that was deleted from the EC treaty was the section abolishing duties 
between Member States, and partly the following section setting up the Com­
mon Customs Tariff, since most of these provisions had become obsolete. To 
accommodate the substantive changes, Title IV on “visa, asylum, immigration 
and other policies affecting free movement of persons” (essentially, provisions 
transferred from the third pillar), Title VIII on employment and Title X on coop­
eration in customs matters were added. In the Union treaty, only a title on flexi­
bility, as we know among the most important substantive changes in the AT, 
was added35. In the other two Community treaties the simplification took an 
easier form: by contrast with the EC treaty, traditional provisions here had from 
the outset been in separate sections, which could simply be deleted.
3. Content of the Simplification
a) Bases
The conceptual guideline in all simplification measures is, as already indicated, 
the scrupulous maintenance of the legal acquis communautaire. Accordingly, 
the simplification confines itself essentially to deleting obsolete provisions. Im­
proving the wording of individual provisions going beyond adjustments required 
by the deletions was in principle deliberately refrained from. The justification 
was that formulations that at first sight seemed redundant had often been chosen 
because the content of individual provisions was not equally unambiguous for 
all parties to the treaties. Equally, vague, ambiguous provisions often conceal a 
political compromise that ought not to be affected in the course of a purely tech­
nical legal clean-up36.
34 Thus Hilf/Pache, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam" NJW 1998, 705 (706); Streinz, "Der Ver- 
trag von Amsterdam", EuZW 1998, 137 (139).
35 For a comprehensive picture see Ehlermann, "Engere Zusammenarbeit nach dem Amster- 
damer Vertrag: Ein neues Verfassungsprinzip?", EuR 1997, 362; for a criticism Weiler, "Am­
sterdam, Amsterdam", European L. J. 3 (1997), 309 (311 If.); see also de Areilza Carva- 
jal/Dastis Quecedo, "Flexibilidad y cooperación reforzadas", Revista de Derecho Comunitario 
Europeo 1997, 7; Constantinesco, "Les clauses de “coopération renforcée” (...)" RTDE 1997, 
751.




























































































In harmony with this approach. Art. 10 of the treaty contains a special 
“acquis guarantee clause”, intended to prevent an undesired anti-integration in­
terpretation of individual simplified provisions37. In detail, Art. 10 (1) provides 
that the repeals, deletions and adjustments in the Community treaties as well as 
the legal effects of these provisions, in particular the effects of the deleted dead­
lines, and also the legal effects of the accession treaties, remain unaffected.38 
This is intended in particular to ensure that failure to meet an expired deadline 
can continue to be actionable before the ECJ. Clause 2 extends this protection of 
the status quo also to legal acts in force enacted on the basis of these provisions; 
clause 3, finally, mentions in the same context explicitly the Convention on 
Common Institutions and the Merger Treaty. Maintenance of the legal acquis is 
further stressed once again in a separate declaration on Art. 10 AT in the Final 
Act39.
According to its regulatory conception, Art. 10 can be understood as an (in­
tertemporal - hierarchical) conflict provision40, whereby if the scope of the sim­
plification is unclear the previously valid version of the provision concerned, if 
appropriate clarified by the ECJ case law, has primacy. It is obvious that the 
comparison of various versions this makes necessary may lead to considerable 
problems in applying the law. Additionally, the importance of the interpretive 
criteria of the new version's wording and of its systematic structure could thus 
be relativized. In practice, to be sure, such difficulties are scarcely to be ex­
pected since first, the simplifications have in any case been done only rather 
cautiously and second, an anti-integration interpretation could not be reconciled 
with the umbrella maxim of effet utile.
b) Special Questions
In detail, in accordance with the general guidelines for the simplification men­
tioned, all time-limited, deadline and transitional provisions that had become ob­
solete were deleted. For symbolic reasons, the deadline in Art. 7a EEC for the 
completion of the internal market, 31.12.199241, was retained, though in view of 
the deletion of the other deadlines this looks like an oversight42. Additionally,
37 See the explanatory report from the Council General Secretariat, OJ C 353/1, 20.11.1997, 2; 
similarly Bundesrats-Drucksache 784/97, 17.10.1997, 162; see also Dodd/Ware/Weston (Fn. 
5), 61f.
38 This is intended in particular to ensure that failure to meet an expired deadline can continue 
to be actionable before the ECJ. Clause 2 extends this protection of the status quo also to legal 
acts in force enacted on the basis o f these provisions; clause 3 finally mentions.
39 Declaration n° 51 to the Final Act.
40 For a basic treatment of these subtypes of law of conflict see Kegel, Allgemeines Kolli- 
sionsrecht, in FS v. Overbeck, 1990, 24.
41 So Jacque (Fn. 5), 903 (909).




























































































abolition obligations and standstill clauses, for instance on duties or on imple­
menting fundamental freedoms, were, in harmony with the established case law 
of the ECJ, reformulated as prohibitions. One exceptional farther-reaching con­
solidation was made in the Act introducing universal direct elections of mem­
bers of the European Parliament, Arts. 1, 2 and 3 (1) of which were, because of 
their “constitutional nature”, rightly taken over into Art. 138 (old version) TEC. 
These provisions concern the principles of universal direct election, the five- 
year term and the number of members per Member State.
A further interesting problem of detail arose with Art. 44 EEC. The sys­
tem of minimum prices it regulates concerns only the transitional period, which 
expired on 31.12.69, so that the provision has clearly become obsolete. How­
ever, the ECJ derived inter alia from this provision the still important principle 
of Community preference, that is, a preference for trade with other Member 
States over third states43. Here the decision was for deleting the provision, 
though setting out in a separate declaration attached to the Final Act that the 
principle mentioned remained unaffected thereby. It would perhaps have been 
more elegant and comprehensible explicitly to incorporate the principle in the 
treaty. The same problem arose with the agreement on the transitional provisions 
under Art. 85 ECSC, obsolete in content, whereas the procedure for concluding 
international treaties by the ECSC contained in it continues as before to be com­
plied with44. In this case, too, the provision was deleted, but the further applica­
tion of the principle provided for in a separate declaration.
Finally, two obvious errors ought not to remain unmentioned. Thus, an 
obviously out-of-date passage in Art. 43 I (old version) EEC was retained: “In 
order to evolve the broad lines of a common agricultural policy, the Commiss- 
sion shall, immediately this Treaty enters into force, convene a conference of the 
Member States with a view to making a comparison of their agricultural poli­
cies....” On this, the General Secretariat’s explanatory report says quite anecdo­
tally and in lapidary fashion: “the conference mentioned in clause 1 was held in 
1958 in Stresa (Italy). It was nonetheless decided to retain this subparagraph”45. 
The report is silent as to the reasons for this decision. Another regrettable blem­
ish is that the Union treaty continues to contain Titles II and III - the provisions
in the Florence Draft (Fn. 2, German version, p. 156f., translator’s note) to retain the date in 
the treaty but point out that it had expired. The wording might then have been: Art 7a : "The 
Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal mar­
ket (...) insofar as these have not yet been carried out following the expiry of the set deadline 
of 31.12.92”.
43 See Jacque (Fn. 5), 905 (9070-
44 It provides that negotiations are to be conducted by the Commission acting on a basis of 
unanimous instructions from the Council, while Member State representatives may take part 
in the negotiations.




























































































of Arts. G through I old version and 8 through 10 new version - which merely 
lay down amendments to the three Community treaties and therefore contain no 
separate meaning within the Union treaty and are correspondingly not printed 
even in text collections - including even the renumbered Union treaty in the ad­
dendum to the Final Act (!). As a supplementary component of the Union treaty, 
these provisions, while not deleted, could have been rearranged in a less clumsy
46way .
4. The Failed Farther-reaching Consolidation
a) Basic Features of the Drafts by the “amis de la présidence”
As already mentioned at the outset, farther-reaching consolidation in the AT had 
been planned in the form of a codification of the main treaties in a single docu­
ment. For this the group of experts called “amis de la présidence”, working in 
parallel with the IGC, had developed various proposals46 7 which were reduced to 
two main alternatives in the course of the conference.
According to the first alternative48 all the four main treaties were to be con­
solidated. As with the academic drafts, the constitutionlike provisions were to be 
put at the start, the three Communities merged and common provisions made for 
the institutions’ actions under the three treaties. The substantive legal provisions 
of the ECSC and Euratom treaties were, as in the Lausanne draft, to be moved 
out to protocols. However, a separation of Community treaties and Union treaty 
into various books was to be retained in order to make sure they were specifi­
cally covered, particularly in the light of the ECJ’s differing competences49. 
Since however the ECSC treaty in any case runs out in 2002, and in the case of 
the Euratom treaty the danger of a politically detrimental debate in connection 
with the new ratification was rated too high, in the later course of the work a 
second consolidation version was preferred, leaving the Euratom and ECSC 
treaties entirely untouched but otherwise containing no differences from the first
46 See Slreinz (Fn. 34), 139.
41 Consolidation alternative 1: merger of the simplified Community treaties while retaining 
the various legal personalities, Doc SN 4230/96; alternative 2: merger of the Community 
treaties while simultaneously merging the legal personalities, Doc. SN 4463/96; alternative 3: 
merger of the Community treaties and the Union treaty while simultaneously merging the le­
gal personalities of the Communities, Doc. SN 4464/96; only this alternative was further pur­
sued. For a comparison of these versions with concordance tables, see Doc SN 4692/96. For a 
review of the work of the “amis de la présidence”, see Jacqué (Fn. 5), 903 (910f).
48 See CONF/4109/97 and CONF/4122/97.
49 Specifically, CONF/4122/97 provided for the following structure; Book 1: Framework pro­
visions for the EU treaty (Art. A-F TEV old version); Book 2: European Community; Book 3: 




























































































version50. The differences between this alternative and the Amsterdam simplifi­
cation are, however, relatively slight.
b) The Reasons for Failure and Declaration N° 42 on the Final Act
As already mentioned, none of the farther-reaching consolidation drafts from the 
“amis de la présidence” were adopted at the IGC. Jean-Paul Jacqué made politi­
cal reasons chiefly responsible for this failure51. A new unitary treaty would 
have had to be ratified again as a whole by Member States. This would lead to a 
danger of new public debate breaking out about provisions long decided, such as 
those on monetary union. Though even the treaties’ rejection would of course 
have been able to change nothing of old law from the legal viewpoint, that might 
understandably have meant political disaster. Moreover, Member States would 
not have felt it desirable to have the technical changes associated in public de­
bate and in ratification in Member States with the substantive innovations of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Instead experience has shown, particularly with the Belgian 
constitutional reform,52 that technical revisions are best done in a separate 
amending procedure where it is clear to the public that no changes of substance 
are involved. For these reasons Member States by majority refrained from far­
ther-reaching consolidation, though ordering in Declaration n° 42 that the con­
solidation efforts begun be continued and the results published on the General 
Secretariat’s responsibility, albeit without legal effect53. Later, this sort of con­
solidation version could still be given the consecration of legal validity.
As members of the “amis de la présidence”, however, explicitly ex­
plained, probably no such intention underlies the declaration mentioned. Instead, 
it was meant in the first place as a “lightning conductor” to “divert attention” 
from the failure of the farther-reaching efforts. The Dublin mandate was seen as 
ultimately preventing merger of the Community and Union treaties; but in order 
to go to meet the Member States that had made this demand and not leave the 
drafts already worked out completely unused, it had been agreed to publish them 
without making them legally binding - and, be it noted, not even under the re­
sponsibility of the Council itself but only of its General Secretariat. The impres­
sion indeed compels itself that despite Jean-Paul Jacqué’s constrasting assertion,
50 See CONF/4133/97.
51 Jacqué (Fn. 5), 903 (912f.); also Petite (Fn. 5), 37.
52 For details on this see Louis, in v. Bogdandy/Ehlermann, "Konsolidierung und Kohiirenz 
des Primârrechts nach Amsterdam", Europarecht, Beiheft 2/1998.
53 It should be stressed in this connection that this declaration was demonstrably, on the basis 
of its genesis, intended to relate only to the failed further consolidation, not to the new Am­
sterdam versions of the Community and Union treaty added as addenda to the Final Act. Oth­
erwise there would indeed be a conflict difficult to solve with the renumbering order, effective 
in international law, in Art. 12 AT, as pointed out by Streinz (Fn. 34), 137 (139), and 




























































































scarcely any thought seems to have been given to introducing a consolidated 
version as a legally valid new treaty text soon. Otherwise, the idea would have 
suggested itself of calling a follow-up revision conference on the Belgian model, 
or at least laying one down in the Declaration as desirable. It should further be 
noted that it would scarcely promote the transparency of primary law nor be ac­
ceptable in practice were the numbering of the treaties to be changed again im- 
medately. One of the best German experts on the European institutions, Claus- 
Dieter Ehlermann, takes the view on this54 that each generation of European 
lawyers could reasonably be expected to put up with this sort of change only 
once. For these reasons, it seems likely that the General Secretariat’s unofficial 
consolidation version(s) will be around for a while55. A personal enquiry at the 
Council’s General Secretariat, finally, showed that publication of these ver­
sions) would have to await the entry into force of the AT.
5. Summary Evaluation
On the whole, it may be said that the AT largely confines itself to “house­
keeping” the treaties by deleting obsolete provisions and making therefore nec­
essary adjustments to remaining ones. Genuine consolidation in the sense of a 
further unification of primary law came only exceptionally, in particular with the 
incorporation of the provisions on elections to the European Parliament into the 
EC treaty, as mentioned. It should also be noted in criticism that the urgently 
needed clarification of the relationship between Union and Communities was 
further postponed. On the whole, of course, the resulting improvement in the 
legibility and transparency of primary law attained in the AT is to be welcomed; 
and alongside this one may also attest a slightly more constitutional look to the 
cleaned up treaties56. Despite this, the otherwise rather thin consolidation out­
come, by comparison with the ambitious academic drafts, has to be disappoint­
ing. This assessment makes the question of the prospects for further consolida­
tion all the more urgent.
54 In a talk with the author in April 1998.
55 It is noteworthy that, according to information from some “amis de la présidence”, the 
States opposed to further consolidation even deliberately pressed for renumbering of the sim­
plified provisions in order thereby to minimize the chances o f later consolidation in view of 
the further renumbering that would then be due. By contrast, some States in favour of con­
solidation had, following the failure of these efforts, turned for the same reason, though with­
out success, against the renumbering (!).




























































































V. Prospects for Further Non-Legislative Consolidation
1. Preliminary
The failure even of the consolidation drafts from the “amis de la présidence", 
reticent by comparison with the academic drafts, shows that the AT has brought 
probably the maximum politically attainable change at present. In particular, a 
merger of Union and Communities is apparently not in line with Member States’ 
alleged symbolic desire to preserve the Union’s control function over the supra­
national Communities57. However, at least a limited consolidation is to be ex­
pected in the near future in the light of the expiry of the ECSC treaty in 2002. 
This is however likely to be confined to the area of the Communities though the 
maximal solution of merging the two remaining Communities and incorporating 
the still relevant ECSC provisions in a unitary Community treaty seems because 
of the then again necessary re-numbering unlikely. Irrespective of this, European 
Parliament in particular is continuing its efforts at further constitutionalization of 
the Union system58.
As a consequence, in view of the currently rather slight chances of any 
further legislative consolidation, enhanced importance attaches to alternative 
possibilities of further simplification of primary law. This paper will look further 
at the proposal adumbrated in the Cambridge Draft for a further-reaching com­
pilation in the form of a Restatement. The basic conception of the US Restate­
ment will be summarized and tested with an eye to its transferability, if neces­
sary with modifications, to European primary law.
2. The Basic Conception of the American Restatement
The production and publication of Restatements by the American Law Institute 
set up specially for the purpose in 1923 by academics and practitioners is in­
tended to remedy the detrimental position that the US case1 law had taken on in­
57 Thus Everling, Ueberlegungen zur Struktur der Europiiischen Union und zum neuen Eu- 
ropa-Artikel des Grundgesetzes, DVBI 1993, 936 (940), explaining that the EU was modelled 
on old French concept of an "Europe des partries" meant to contain the supranational commu­
nities; on the structure of the Union, see also Curtin, the Constitutional Structure of the Un­
ion: A Europe of bits and pieces, CMLR 30 (1993), 17; v. Bogdandy/ Nettesheim, "Die Eu- 
ropaische Union: Ein einheitlicher Verband mit eigener Rechtsordnung", EuR 1996, 3; see 
also the contributions by v. Bogdandy, Kadelbach, Konig, Miiller-Graff and Zuleeg in v. 
Bogdandy/Ehlermann (eds.), "Konsolidierung und Koharenz des Primarrechts nach Amster­
dam", Europarecht, Beiheft 2/1998.
58 A working group at the Robert Schuman Centre, EUI Florence, commissioned by the Par­
liament, has again analysed further possibilities o f constitutionalizing the treaties. See the fi­
nal report "Quelle Charte constitutionnelle pour l'Union européenne? Strategies et options 




























































































creasingly incalculable dimensions59. These uncertainties were increased still 
further by State competence for the bulk of American law, and particular the 
whole of private law, and the resulting differences in the law of the various 
states. As a private initiative by the legal profession, the legally non-binding Re­
statement was intended to contribute to clarification and systematization, as well 
as also largely to unification, further development and improvement of the case 
law by reformulating general principles derived from the case material and 
summarizing them in a legal text resembling a codification. The Restatement 
would help lawyers in searching the case material and to a certain extent even 
relieve the courts from their own evaluation of the precedents. While in first 
generation Restatements the summarizing of guiding principles was still to the 
fore, in the second and third generation of Restatements, produced from the 50s 
onward, the comments and illustrations attached to the principles gained in im­
portance. These contain in particular assessments basic to the formulation of the 
principles, along witti the precedents used (indicated in the footnotes). Addition­
ally, all decisions in which the Restatements are cited were separately published 
(“Restatement in the Courts”). While, moreover, the first Restatements exclu­
sively concerned areas of State private law, like contract, tort and restitution, 
later compilations also covered other areas coming under federal legislative 
competence. To be noted here is in particular the 1987 Restatement Third on 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States containing the international law in 
force (in the American view) with references to foreign trade law and interna­
tional procedural law. It is true that the Restatements are rarely adduced by the 
courts as the sole basis for decision but mostly only as one of several sources of 
a legal view. Nevertheless, their authority as a so-called secondary source of law 
is well above that of text books and commentaries. And the gain in systematiza­
tion and unification reached through them cannot be overlooked. Last but not 
least, Restatements offer beginners and foreign lawyers in particular a valuable 
basis for a systematic grasp of American law.
3. Chances for a Restatement of Primary Law and a “European Law Institute”
The advantages of the Restatement in the American case-law system indicated 
make adopting it in the area of European primary law, which is in vast areas also 
constituted by case law, worthy of consideration60. The fact that Community law
59 For more detail see Schindler, "Die Restatements und ihre Bedeutung fur das amerikanische 
Privatrecht”, Zeitschrift Jur Europaisches Privatrecht 1998, 275; Gray, "E pluribus unum? A 
Bicentennial Report of Unification of Law in the United States", RabelsZ 50 (1986), 111 
(119ff); C. Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht und nationalen 
Recht, 1996, 138ff.
60 In European private law Restatements have been discussed for some time now as an in­
strument for non-legislatory unification of law (cf. eg, Remien, "Rechtseinheit ohne Einheits- 




























































































applies uniformly in all Member States and is also monitored by a central Euro­
pean jurisdiction should only facilitate working out such a compilation and 
make basic divergencies less likely, but not take away its usefulness. For in pri­
mary law, too, systematic summarizing and commenting on the lines of the more 
recent American Restatements could make a major contribution to increasing 
transparency61.
Like the American model, the Restatement should try to transform the ju­
risprudence into specific rules and contain comments and cases for illustrative 
purposes. In the footnotes, important legal literature in all European languages 
should be quoted. Thus, a Restatement would be somewhat different from Ger­
man-style commentaries in that the formulation of general rules should further 
enhance the rationalisation of problems and the discovery of inconsistencies in 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence. In terms of content, a Restatement might build on the 
preliminary work in the Cambridge draft, but go farther to accomplish the main 
intentions of the Lausanne and Florence drafts, too, bringing all the important 
legal texts together into one treaty. Like these drafts, a Restatement should ac­
cordingly contain a section on the Union’s constitutional bases (including the 
ECJ’s famous doctrines of autonomy, direct effect, primacy, interpretation in 
conformity with directives, State liability, etc), a general part on institutions, le­
gal instruments, procedures and judicial review powers. It could also bring about 
one of the oldest demands from the European Parliament62, but also of several 
Member States: an exhaustive catalogue of European fundamental rights that 
could be put at the start of the text, even before the provisions on Union citizen­
ship, and illustrated by the relevant ECJ decisions. It would be important for 
getting the Restatement accepted for it to keep strictly to the law as it stands, so 
that it could be used without reservations in applying the law in the Union’s eve­
ryday legal reality. Such a compilation could thus give primary law all round a
uniform law: European contract law and its components", Legal Studies 18 (1998), 121). In 
particular, the socalled ’Principles of European Contract Law’ (Lando/Beale (eds.) 1995), 
elaborated in a comparative perspective by national academics and meant to constitute a syn­
thesis of national contract laws, have been qualified as a Restatement of European private 
law. Finally, it should be noted that, in other central areas of Community law, too, like com­
petition and anti-trust law, a Restatement might do good work.
61 Though Declaration 42 on the Final Act of the AT, as mentioned, orders the publication of 
further consolidated versions without legal validity - which may evoke associations with a 
Restatement - it seems, however, neither realistic nor sensible for such a compilation to be 
based on this provision and worked out by the General Secretariat. For, first, Declaration n° 
42, as we have shown, was adopted in order to publish drafts already elaborated by the Gen­
eral Secretariat. Alongside this, as also mentioned, it would be desirable for an institution 
with higher authority than the General Secretariat, and to boot not under time pressure, to 
make the Restatement idea a reality.
62 See most recently Parliament’s resolution on the Treaty of Amsterdam, "Europe"! Docu­




























































































of something more like a constitution - an endeavour that would scarcely 
iiave prospects of assent from all Member States as a legally binding text.
The decisive thing for the success of a Restatement is no doubt for it to be 
produced by a European institution of high authority and published in all Com­
munity official languages. A transnational professional institution of European 
lawyers on the model of the American Law Institute would no doubt be the ideal 
vehicle. It would also seem conceivable for a Community institution, especially 
the Parliament, to mandate an academic institution in which all Member States 
are if possible represented to produce this work. Irrespective of the specific ve­
hicular institution, it would also be important, for a Restatement to work, that it 
should as far as possible include the Commission and Courts in producing it. For 
the Restatement’s authority would likely depend in practice on whether these 
institutions consistently use it in their decisions and also cite individual provi­
sions from it. Additionally, in order to be capable of use in everyday legal life, a 
Restatement would have to be adapted at regular intervals to new law and juris­
prudence.
While dangers associated with a Restatement can scarcely be seen in view 
of its lack of legal validity, its utility could be manifold. It is, first, obvious that a 
main text giving the Union’s constitutional bases, including fundamental and 
human rights, broad space could present the Union in an incomparably more 
positive and transparent light and ideally help it to more acceptance by its citi­
zens. To this end, uncommented versions of the Restatement giving only the 
rules could also be published. Additionally, this sort of compilation of primary 
law in force could also facilitate an insight into European law for legal begin­
ners. Thus, it could be useful for teaching purposes, too. Further, it could for 
European accession candidates be a clearer and perhaps also more easily acces­
sible source for acquainting themselves with the legal acquis communautaire.
Further advantages might arise for legal science itself. At present, as we 
know, the academic treatment of European law largely takes a relatively national 
approach. So while the area is increasingly covered in a growing number of 
commentaries, journals and textbooks in the various Member States, these do 
not always employ the foreign literature to a satisfactory extent; and only a few 
very famous textbooks are translated into other European languages. The whole 
national secondary literature, moreover, tends to be marked in terms of style, 
structure and presentation by the various national legal academic traditions63. A 
Restatement produced by outstanding scholars and practitioners from various
63 For instance, German works frequently focus heavily on dogmatic details and often also 
contain example cases handled according to traditional syllogistic techniques. By contrast in 
the Latin legal world, especially in Mediterranean countries, rather rhetorically oriented and 




























































































Member States, with commentaries and illustrative cases, could by contrast de­
velop the beginnings of a genuinely European style that could contribute to a 
“Europeanization of European Legal Science”.
Additionally, the European legal profession could through a Restatement 
gain greater influence over the case law of the European Court. While appar­
ently a large part of the abundant legal literature on European law, particularly 
pieces written in less accessible languages - among which German has to be 
counted - are scarcely yet noticed by most judges and officials in the Commu­
nity, a Restatement would mean a sort of bundling of the authority of scholars 
and practitioners from the various States. The European courts would as a con­
sequence see themselves confronted with a respected review body of the Euro­
pean legal profession speaking with a single voice, which could thus critically 
accompany the systematics and consistency of case law and thus place the courts 
under greater legitimation and justification pressure.
Enhanced influence for a “European Law Institute” or a similar transna­
tional institution would - something that cannot be more than mentioned in the 
present context - presumably be a thing to welcome from viewpoints of demo­
cratic theory as well. At present, the European “multi-level polity”, due to the 
absence of a largely homogeneous European demos, still lacks important requi­
sites of an identity-supported, “input-oriented” democracy. Therefore, apart 
from drawing on “output-oriented” mechanisms to convey democratic legiti­
macy, alternative “input-oriented” concepts, which do not depend on a European 
demos, need to be developed.64 The most prominent one among these seems to 
be the concept of deliberative supranationalism, which essentially builds on 
“external and taming deliberative political processes between institutional actors 
and societies”65, in which, ideally, the best solutions emerge because of their 
higher rational persuasiveness. Thus, a European institution of the legal profes­
sion could considerably enhance truly transnational deliberations on the "best 
interpretation of laws" and the "best law". Such processes might take on out­
standing importance also because of the greater importance of this medium in 
the Union by comparison with Member States because of the lower basic politi­
cal consensus66.
Finally, it would be a perhaps not untypical development for the Commu­
nity if a Restatement could, following a longish period of proving and the con­
tinued incorporation of new case law, manage to make its way with Commission
64 On the distinction between input- and output-oriented democratic legitimation, see Scharpf, 
Problem-solving capacities o f multi-level governance, forthcoming, Chapter 1.
65 Joerges, "European Challenges to Private Law", European L. J. 3 (1997), 377 (389).





























































































and Court support as an important European constitutional text. Since the start 
of the Community, important steps in integration have frequently been attained 
not just through political course-setting by Member States, but also through far­
sighted decisions by its lawyers, especially its judges. Ultimately, thus, a Re­
statement might even to some extent compensate for the lacking political con­
sensus among Member States in favour of further-reaching consolidation of 
primary law, and a “European Law Institute” might evolve into an important 
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